We provide new evidence on the effects of the recently introduced short sale circuit breaker, Rule 201, which triggers when the price of a stock drops more than 10 percent in a single day. The regulatory presumption is that the trigger should damper intraday price declines for affected stocks. However, our evidence suggests that this is not the case. The circuit breaker fails to reduce intraday volatility and intraday price declines, especially for the most volatile stocks in the market. This is not a small-cap phenomenon. Market quality measures based on liquidity and pricing efficiency are largely unaffected. Higher dispersion of investor opinion increases overpricing when the circuit breaker is in force. Price stabilization after stocks trigger the circuit breaker is shown for stocks that experience substantial price declines. Finally, post shock drift reduction is consistent with improved informational efficiency. JEL Codes: G10, G12, G14, G18
Introduction
Short selling has been at the center of debate amongst academics, industry participants, and the media for decades. The core question is the exact role of short selling that short selling should play in marketplace. A standard position of academics is that short selling is an essential part of the price discovery process.
1 Many industry observers, including company executives and market commentators, often characterize short selling as a destabilizing factor in the markets that exacerbates market declines during periods of market turmoil. As an example of this perspective, the collapses of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch during the 2008 financial crisis were directly attributable to the actions of shorts sellers.
2
Regulators have generally taken the positon that short selling can promote market efficiency, but requires certain constraints in order to forestall market collapses due to excessive trading by short sellers. In 1938, the United States Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC) adopted the first short sale regulation, known as the Uptick Rule, which addresses issues such as failures to deliver on covered positions and abusive naked short sales. 3 Since then, financial markets have seen been subject to a number of regulatory changes that affect short selling. Regulation SHO, which became effective on January 3, 2005 represents a recent overhaul of the rules guiding market participants. In 2007, after conducting a pilot program, the SEC concluded that the Uptick Rule made no discernible differences in the trading patterns of stocks and repealed the Uptick Rule (see also Diether, Lee, and Werner, 2009) . Rule 204T strengthens close-out requirements by applying Regulation SHO on a broader range of securities and require faster close-out of positions with failures to deliver. It was adopted by the SEC as a part of the 2008
Emergency Order that banned short selling for a group of financial companies. Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) , , Autore, Billingsley, and Kovacs (2011) , and argue that this ban distorts market quality. Christopher Cox, the Chairman of the SEC at the time, also argued that the costs of the short sale ban outweigh the benefits. 4 Regulation SHO reintroduced the price test restriction with Rule 201, also known as the Short Sale Price Test Circuit Breaker/Alternative Uptick Rule or the short sale circuit breaker. Rule 201 activates the price test restriction that proscribes stock short sales when the price of a stock declines more than 10 percent in a single day.
We contribute to the debate on short selling by providing new evidence on the effectiveness of this recently introduced Rule 201. Our paper assembles a unique database from various sources that enables us to examine its impact on the extent of price declines of affect stocks, market quality, and market efficiency for stocks traded on the NYSE and Nasdaq from 2009 to 2012.
We identify target stocks by applying Rule 201 on days before its introduction and analyze the changes brought by Rule 201.
Our evidence suggests that Rule 201 does not reduce intraday volatility or the downward price pressure of stocks. Our portfolio test on stocks that are sorted into quintiles based on intraday price declines shows no significant differences between groups. In fact, stocks in nine out of ten 4 Christopher Cox, telephone interview to Reuters, 31 December 2008. decile portfolios decline more in the post-breaker period, on average. This difference is not significant, however, and reflects the increased volatility of the market overall rather than the effects of Rule 201 per se. To reinforce this result, we construct 10 percentile portfolios that only include stocks that could have triggered the circuit breaker in the pre-breaker period (if they were subject to Rule 201)) or actually triggered the circuit breaker(in the post-breaker period).
Significantly worse price declines are observed in the Rule 201 period for the value weighted portfolio. Furthermore, the deterioration of returns of affected stocks in the post-breaker period is also found to be statistically significant. We document price reversals following large price declines, showing that Rule 201 does increases market stability. However we do not find evidence of overpricing when a stock is affected by Rule 201. We also show that the circuit breaker substantially reduces price drifts after large price declines. This circuit breaker trigger does facilitate the market's digestion of negative information on the stressed stocks, which is consistent with an enhancement of market efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide some background and a brief review the literature. Section 3 discusses the methodology and hypotheses. A description of the data and the empirical results are presented in section 4.
Section 5 concludes with a summary.
Background and Literature Review
A. The Uptick Rule
Despite the nearly 80-year long history of the uptick rule, only a few studies have been conducted on its effects. Most studies argue for its repeal. Alexander and Peterson (1999) track order execution status on the NYSE during May 1996.
They find that, because the uptick rule limits the minimum shorting price to be at a level higher than the highest bid price, short orders cannot be executed in more than 89% of the trading time in 1/8-point markets. The proportion of no-short-trade time rises to 98% in ¼-point markets.
Although the SEC states "allowing relative short selling in advancing markets" as one of the three goals of the uptick rule 5 , Alexander and Peterson find that the trading time and order execution rate of short orders remain very limited in advancing markets. Macey, Mitchell, and Netter (1988) suggest that the uptick rule exacerbated price declines during the market crash on October 19, 1987 due to obstructed index arbitrage, which hinders the efficiency of the price discovery process. Alexander and Peterson (2008) find that after revocation of the uptick rule was lifted, short orders still traded at a price higher than the bid-ask midpoint. This phenomenon is alluded to as one of the side effects of the uptick rule in their 1999 paper. Blau and Brough (2012) find that short sellers use more large orders when they are not subject to the uptick rule, possibly due to reduced liquidity. study the effect of repealing the uptick rule and argue that the uptick rule has a modest effect on shorting but may benefit the market by increasing liquidity and other market quality measures. They do not find evidence supporting an overvaluation effect or a price reversal effect as implied by short sale constraint theories by Miller (1977) and Harrison and Kreps (1978) .
5 Security Act Release No.16964. July 9, 1980. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) investigate the changes brought by the "Pilot Program", which was mandated by the SEC to study the necessity of the uptick rule. They find increasing short activity in Pilot stocks but no significant changes in terms of daily returns and volatility. Slight increases in spreads and intraday volatility are documented as well. They conclude that the effect of the uptick rule can be largely attributed to order flow distortion created by the rule itself and thus, the uptick rule can be safely removed.
The United States is not the only market with a "tick rule." In 1994, Hong Kong Stock Exchange introduced virtually the same price test for the list of designated securities eligible for short selling. Chang, Chen, and Yu (2007) find the "tick rule" barely hinders short selling activities as stocks added to the short list experience significant return declines. In other words, when stocks are ineligible for short selling, they are overpriced. The overpricing effect is stronger for stocks with a wider dispersion of investor opinions.
B. The 2008 Short Sale Ban
What will happen if we take the regulatory short sale constraint to the extreme? The Emergency Order 6 placed by the SEC during the 2008 financial crisis is by far the most powerful setting available to answer this question. Various studies have examined the impact of the 2008 short sale ban; most of them conclude that the ban impaired market quality.
Two deleterious effects associated with the short sale ban have been postulated: price inflation and reduced market liquidity. Boulton and Braga-Alves (2010) show that the elimination of naked short selling for restricted stocks is countered by considerable increases of naked shorts in closely matched financial firms not subject to the ban. In line with Miller's (1977) 6 Release NO. 34-58592, 18 September 2008. overvaluation theory, prices of the banned stocks are found to be inflated with estimates ranging from 10% (Harris and Namvar, and Phillips, 2013) to 16.5% (Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2010 ).
Beber and Pagano (2013) examine the short sale bans around the world during the crisis period.
However, they do not find significant price inflation in other countries due to the bans. After the ban is lifted, the inflation of stock prices in the U.S. market disappears (Autore, Billingsley, and Kovacs, 2011) .
Liquidity for the banned stocks is significantly reduced due to the inability of short sellers to sell short (Woolridge and Dickinson, 1994) as well as the unwillingness of institutions to establish long positions that are difficult to hedge (Autore, Billingsley, and Kovacs, 2011) . Spreads for restricted stocks increase dramatically during the ban (Boulton and Braga-Alves, 2010; . Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2012) find more frequent put-call parity violations for banned stocks. This is to be expected as option market makers are deterred from writing puts when they are unable to hedge their positions by shorting. Battalio and Schultz (2011) document a sharp increase in option trading costs. The reduction of liquidity is a side effect shared by short sale bans around the world, it is particularly strong for small cap stocks and stocks with no tradable options .
The overall costs of the 2008 short sale ban on market quality are seen more intuitively in dollar values. In the option market, liquidity costs paid by investors are conservatively estimated to be $505 million whereas in the stock market, the amount of abnormal wealth transferred from buyers to sellers is conservatively estimated to be between $2.3 to $4.9 billion (Harris, Namvar, and Phillips, 2013 ).
C. Rule 201
The paper that is most directly related to our study is Jan, Jain, and McInish (2012 limited full compliance period and the pre-approval period, which leaves a time gap of more than one year. Halmrast (2015) also omits data for 2011 and discards four months of data for 2012 because they are deemed to be too "volatile. Huge gaps in time series are undesirable in differences-in-differences studies as they allow market-wide events to affect target and control group stocks unevenly, distorting the true treatment effect. In other words, the reliability of the differences-in-differences results is severely impaired. Our study remedies this problem by extending the sample to include two years of daily and intra-day data in the pre-breaker period and one year in the post-breaker period.
Second, our algorithm for the implementation of Rule 201 is both transparent and more comprehensive. While both Jan, Jain, and McInish (2012) and Halmrast (2015) try to recover short halts that should have taken place in the pre-breaker period, neither of them provide statistics describing the effectiveness and accuracy of their analogous Rule 201 algorithm. We address this issue and present the performance of our analogous algorithm benchmarked against actual exchange short halt records.
Third, we account for the effects of huge intraday declines, which may be outliers. The nature of the short sale circuit breaker implies that it is a subset of huge price movements. However, neither Jan, Jain, and McInish (2012) nor Halmrast (2015) respectively. While Nasdaq records are available on a timely basis, and start exactly from the full compliance date, NYSE records lag by years. In order to keep NYSE stocks in the sample, an algorithm that replicates the mechanism of the short sale circuit breaker is implemented to recover the short halts data immediately after the compliance date. More importantly, this algorithm allows us to back-test the effectiveness of the circuit breaker even before the announcement date and identify target stocks of the circuit breaker.
The mechanism of the circuit breaker is quite straightforward: if stocks decline by 10 percent or more from their last closing prices in a single day, they are subject to the alternative uptick rule for the remainder of that day as well as the following trading day. The key is to determine whether a stock declines 10 percent in one day. This can be easily done by looking at tick-by-tick data and examine the price changes in percentage. However, the daily low price records serve us equally well as any stock with a daily low price at least 10 percent less than its last closing price must have triggered the circuit breaker. To see why, assume stock ABC closes at $100 on June What explain the missing records in the CRSP halts? In most cases, we find that the CRSP records show that the intraday declines of the stocks with non-matched exchange halts were less than 10 percent (in fact, their median decline was 7.7%). In other words, the exchange records, indicate that these stock prices declined intraday for at least 10 percent at some point over the day but CRSP records indicate a lesser decline that does not trigger a halt. The most likely cause of the small discrepancy lies in the determination of "closing price". Rule 201 states that the percentage decline is computed based on the closing price "as determined by the listing market for the covered security as of the end of regular trading hours on the prior day." However, if
there is no closing price for the security for the prior day, the last traded price, as determined by the listing market, is used. Therefore, there might be differences in the "last closing price" determined by the exchanges and the closing price recorded in CRSP.
B. Hypotheses
From the preceding discussion of the short sale circuit breaker, the following four hypotheses are proposed.
HYPOTHESIS 1: The short sale circuit breaker does not attenuate large intraday declines or affect intraday volatility.
This hypothesis directly tests the raison d'etre of the short sale circuit breaker. The circuit breaker becomes effective when the price of a stock drops more than 10 percent in a single day; it prevents short selling at a price lower than the national best bid. If the large price drop is not primarily caused by the short sellers, the circuit breaker will not dampen price further price declines. Restricted short sell orders are of no benefit to investors on the bid side to restore prices to higher level. Thus, we do not expect to see the extent of large intraday declines significantly reduced by the circuit breaker. Furthermore, we do not expect intraday volatility to be affected for two reasons. First, due to the extreme trigger condition, only a fraction of the trading stocks are affected on a given day; second, the circuit breaker restricts the price at which short orders can be placed, it does not ban short selling. Long selling is still permitted with the circuit breaker in effect. Therefore, we expect the influence of the short-sale circuit breaker on the market as a whole to be limited.
HYPOTHESIS 2: Stocks that trigger the circuit breaker do not become significantly overpriced.
This hypothesis tests for the possible costs to the market quality. It is based on the overvaluation theory introduced by Miller (1977) and optimism models of short sale constraints. Specifically, Miller (1977) suggests that, in the presence of divergent opinion, short sale restraints prevents the market from effectively incorporating negative information and causes stock overvaluation.
The short sale circuit breaker imposes the alternative uptick rule that restricts short selling, but its effect only lasts two days. Thus, we do not expect to see significant overpricing effects when the circuit breaker is active.
HYPOTHESIS 3: The overpricing effect is larger for stocks with wider dispersion in investor opinions.
This hypothesis is an extension of Hypothesis 2. Its focus is the second condition in Miller's (1997) overvaluation theory, which states that the level of overpricing increases with greater divergence of investor opinion. Hence, any overvaluation effect of the circuit breaker that occurs should be positively related to the level of divergence of investor opinion.
HYPOTHESIS 4: The short sale circuit breaker reduces the extent of price reversal and postshock drift after large price declines.
This hypothesis tests the informational role of the short sale circuit breaker. Stocks exchanges publish lists of short halted stocks every day. Such lists provide information relevant to actual and potential short-sellers, but can also be viewed as sources of bad news for investors as a whole. This improves market informational efficiency as negative information is quickly released to the public that highlights stocks that might have deteriorated fundamentals. We expect the circuit breaker to attenuate two of the most studied post-shock anomalies: price reversal and post-shock drift. The consensus of the literature is that the underlying causes of these anomalies are investor overreaction and underreaction, respectively (Atkins and Dyl, 1990; Larson, Madura, 2003; ) . Overreaction and underreaction are consequences of inefficient information incorporation. Investors tend to overreact to private information but not to public information (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Larson, Madura, 2003) . The timely release of this signal may attenuate both overreaction and underreaction (Chan, 2003 ). Further price deterioration or possible reversals would be constrained because the circuit breaker inhibits short sellers from placing aggressive short orders which helps to buttress stock prices.
Data and Empirical Results

A. Data Description
This paper uses daily security price data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), analyst forecasts from I/B/E/S, and short halt records from NYSE and Nasdaq. The sample covers domestic stock (share code 10 or 11) over the period May 10, 2009 to February 10, 2012.
Only domestic stocks (share code 10 or 11). Financial and utility firms are excluded, as are stocks with a ticker longer than 4-letters, and observations with missing closing prices. The final sample includes 3407 stocks from 3385 firms and 1,841,593 stock-day observations. All sample stocks trade on either Nasdaq or NYSE. Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the stocks in the sample. In Panel A, we can see that about 167 stocks are affected by the short sale circuit breaker on an average day in the sample period. From the second row, we observe that about 90 stocks trigger the breaker on an average day, which leaves 77 (=167 -90) stocks that experience the lagged short halt effect. It worth noting that among the 90 halted stocks, 13 (14.4%) retrigger the circuit breaker. That is, these stocks decline at least 10% over the day while the short sale circuit breaker is in effect and hence retrigger the ban on short selling below the national best bid. This could reflect a delayed price discovery process.
[Please insert Table 2 about here]
In the last row of Table 2 , we scale the stocks subject to the circuit breaker by the average number of stocks trading on each day. It is evident that the circuit breaker affects a little more than 3% of stocks on an average trading day in the sample. The worst day in the sample is August 8, 2011, also known as the Black Monday, in which more than 48.8% of the stocks are affected by the short sale circuit breaker. The month of August 2011 accounts for fiver of the top ten most volatile days. The market turmoil began with S&P's unprecedented downgrading of the United States' credit rating from triple A to "AA+."
Panel B of Table 2 provides summary statistics of the stocks in the sample. . The average daily closing price is around $21. Nearly five percent of the stocks are penny stocks, which could be strongly affected by the bid-ask bounce problem. We account for this in the empirical tests by excluding stocks trading at a price lower than $10 the day before triggering the circuit breaker.
The intraday decline, as reported in the second row, is computed as the difference between the daily low price and the previous closing price, scaled by the previous closing price. The average intraday decline in the sample is a little more than two percent. The corresponding average decline for the fifth percentile is 7.2%. A smaller fraction of the observations crossed the 10% circuit breaker line.
In Figure 1 , we plot the date and time distribution of the exchange short halts in 2016. As we can see in Panel A, stocks trigger the circuit breaker more frequently in the beginning of the year than near the end of the year. Panel B demonstrates short halts distribution among the trading hours. A considerable proportion of the short halts happen right after market opens. This is expected as investors accumulated information overnight and started adjusting their positions when the market opens. Overall, there are no significant clusterings in date or time.
[Please insert Figure 1 about here]
B. Effects on intraday market volatility
We first test the effect of the circuit breaker on intraday volatility in general. Since the circuit breaker affects roughly 3% of the stocks, we do not expect significant changes in the intraday volatility. Table 3 [Please insert Table 3 about here]
Let us first examine the diff column for the behavior of the Low portfolio. quintile portfolio with the lowest i prior to the triggering of the circuit breaker. The introduction of the circuit breaker is associated with small and insignificant look at the diff column of the Low portfolio first. The introduction of the circuit breaker is associated with small and insignificant increases in its 
C. Effects on intraday decline of stock prices
We now change the focus of our analysis to investigate the impact of the circuit breaker on the intraday price declines of stocks. The intraday decline is an important performance measure for the circuit breaker because it directly determines whether Rule 201 is triggered, and may also capture feedback across all stocks in the market. If the intraday price declines are due to downward price manipulation by short sellers, then by applying the alternative uptick rule, the circuit breaker should reduce the extent of declines. Concurrently, we do not expect downward pressure on prices for stocks that do not trigger the circuit breaker.
In Table 4 , stocks are sorted into decile portfolios based on their intraday declines to identify the impact of the circuit breaker across firms experiencing downward stock price movements of varying magnitudes. In addition, 10, 7.5, and 5 percentile portfolios are constructed to take closer snapshots of the most volatile part of the market. The 10 percentile portfolio includes stocks that decline intraday by at least 10 percent. The 7.5 and 5 percentile portfolios are constructed in the same manner. The decile portfolios and the three percentile portfolios are rebalanced daily.
[Please insert Table 4 about here]
The pre (post) column represents the time-series average of the intraday decline of the portfolio.
The diff column reports the coefficient estimate of circuit breaker dummy from a time-series regression of the variable on an intercept (not reported) and the circuit breaker dummy. The circuit breaker dummy equals to one if the date is in the post-circuit breaker period and zero otherwise. Value-weighted (VW) and equal-weighted (EW) results are reported to alleviate the potential model specification problem for small firms (Fama 1998).
As one can see in Table 4 , the EW and VW results are similar, for the most part 9 Both Panel A and Panel B report downward increases in the extent of intraday decline in most ranked portfolios, as the t-statistics are all negative. However, none of the differences is significant.
Since the circuit breaker only affects stocks decline intraday by 10 percent or more, the more severe intraday declines observed for the post circuit breaker period can hardly be attributed to the effects of the short sale circuit breaker per se, since this effect is found in every rank of the value-weighted decile portfolios. This result is not observed for small cap stocks, based on the equal-weighted portfolio results. Since significant results are shown for the value-weighted portfolio, but not for the equal-weighted portfolios, Panel C also suggests that triggering the circuit breaker is not a small-cap phenomenon.
However, an alternative explanation is that intraday volatility of the market increases and the behavior of the sorted portfolios reflects enhanced market volatility in the post circuit breaker regime. In the next section, we separate general market shift effects from the effects of the short sale circuit breaker by contrasting the changes between targeted stocks and non-targeted stocks.
D. Effects on targeted stocks
In this test, a difference-in-difference test is carried out by running pooled regressions of the performance proxies (treated variables) on an intercept, a circuit breaker dummy, a treatment dummy, and the interaction of the circuit breaker dummy and the treatment dummy. Specifically, the model is as follows
where is the intraday decline, turnover, or raw return of stock on day . There are two types of treatments: Halt is the dummy that equals to one if the intraday decline of stock is larger than or equal to 10 percent on day and zero otherwise; Effect is the dummy that equals to one when the circuit breaker is effective for stock on day . is the circuit breaker dummy that equals to one if the date is in the post-circuit breaker period (February 28, 2011 -February 28, 2012 and zero otherwise. Note that once triggered, the circuit breaker is effective for the remaining of that day and the following business day, so that makes Effect cover Halt and the day after Halt. * is the interaction term that equals one if both and are equal to one.
The difference-in-differences model compares the difference between pre-and post-circuit breaker periods in the control group ( 1 = ( + 1 ) − ) to the difference in the target group
( 1 + 3 = ( + 1 + 2 + 3 ) − ( + 2 )). Assuming the common shock(s) influences the control and target group equally, then the interaction term ( 3 = ( 1 + 3 ) − 1 ) cancels out the effects of common shocks by subtracting the difference in the control group from that in the target group. Therefore, our main interest is in the coefficient of 3 , which captures the effect of the short sale circuit breaker on targeted stocks.
In Table 6 , the treatment for models 1, 3, and 5 is the short halt event whereas that for models 2, 4, and 6, the treatment represents the effect of the circuit breaker, which is one trading day longer than the short halt treatment. We examine the short halt treatment first. Model 1 tests its influence on the intraday decline. The circuit breaker improved the extent of intraday decline by a non-significant 0.21% (t=0.89). The circuit breaker increases, the turnover ratio (a measure of market liquidity) by approximately 0.35% but this effect is not significant (t=1.4). It significantly reduces the return by 0.57%, with a t-statistic of -13.35. When we change the treatment to effect, the results are qualitatively similar. This implies the effect of the short sale circuit breaker is concentrated on the day of short halt. Thus, the short sale circuit breaker does not significantly reduce the extent of intraday decline of stocks and can potentially worsen the daily returns for affected stocks. Once again, liquidity, measured by share turnover, is not significantly affected by the circuit breaker.
[Please insert Table 5 about here]
There may be concerns that the highly autocorrelated circuit breaker dummy, which is zero and one for all observations before and after the compliance date, respectively, might cause the errors to be autocorrelated. Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) point out that failure to account for error autocorrelation can result in a high probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis in the differences-in-differences analysis. To access this potential issue, the first, second, and third autocorrelation coefficients are estimated. The coefficients are obtained by simply regressing the residuals on their corresponding lags. The t-statistics for the estimated first, second, and third autocorrelation coefficients are 0.75, -0.95, and 0.33, respectively. The coefficient of determination of the lagged model is 0.00%. Therefore, no significant error autocorrelation is detected and the standard error estimation is robust to autocorrelation. Models are also estimated with Newey-West error correction of 5 lags (Newey and West, 1987) . The results are almost identical to those reported here.
Questions could also be raised at the differences-in-differences methodology itself. By construction, one implicitly assumes that other factors affect the target stocks and control stocks equally. There is no guarantee that every market-wide event affects each group in the same manner, but if the population of effects of the events follows a normal distribution, the overall effect of other factors should distribute evenly on target and control stocks.
In sum, our results are consistent with Hypothesis 1. Our empirical tests find no significant reduction in intraday price declines of the volatile stocks, as a result of constraints on shortsellers associated with the circuit breaker. Nor is there evidence of a reduction in intraday volatility.
E. Abnormal return measures
Once activated, the short sale circuit breaker imposes the alternative uptick rule, which prevents short selling at a price lower than the national best bid price, on affected stocks. This is a typical type of short sale constraint. Miller (1977) The expected return is estimated using the Carhart four-factor model (Carhart, 1997) , which is an extension of the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama, French, 1993) including a momentum factor. The abnormal returns, , and cumulative abnormal returns, , are estimated as
Where is stock 's return on day (I take the day the stock triggers the breaker as event day 0), is the risk-free return represented by one-month U.S. Treasury bill rate. The coefficients � and ̂' s are estimates of the intercept and risk factor loadings from a time-series regression of stock 's daily return, , on the daily Fama-French risk factors, 10 in the estimation window.
(Small Minus Big) is the average return on the nine small stock portfolios minus the average return on the nine big stock portfolios on day t; (High Minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios, (Winners Minus Losers) is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios. is the excess return on the market, value-weight return of all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or Nasdaq that have a CRSP share code of 10 or 11 at the beginning of month t.
Throughout the paper, the length of estimation window is set to 250 days, unless otherwise specified. In addition, for an event to be included in the sample, it must have at least 150 daily return records in its estimation window. Furthermore, stocks must be trading at least $10 per share on the day before the event. This requirement is imposed to reduce possible biases due to bid-ask bounce of low-price stocks (Brown, Harlow, Tinic, 1988; .
The threshold is chosen to be $10 to align our results with those from Park (1995) and Cox, Peterson (1994) , who use a $10 criterion to in their studies of large intraday price movements. 
F. Abnormal Return Results
In Table 6 , the cross-sectional average of ARs surrounding short sale circuit breaker events is reported. For each event, the factor loadings are estimated using a window spanning from 260 days before the event to 31 days before the event.
[Please insert Table 6 about here]
As per the overvaluation theory, stocks facing short sale constraints might become overpriced. In our case, the days of short sale constraints are the two days that the circuit breaker is active, day 0 and day 1. This is not surprising since we focus on days with large intraday declines. One drawback of using returns on day 0 as the returns under short sale constraints is that, depending on the exact time of trigger, only a proportion of the trading time is short-constrained. Thus, we also look at day 1, in which the short sale circuit breaker is active throughout the day. Table 6 shows the average abnormal return on day 1 is negative but is economically (-0.077%) and statistically insignificant (t=-0.9). Since neither day 0 nor day 1 results show positive abnormal returns, there is no indication that short halted stocks become overpriced.
Let us look at days in the pre-event and post-event windows. Most of the mean abnormal returns from day -10 to day -1 are negative, but only those of day -2 and -1 are statistically significant. and (1,10) are insignificant. This rejects the delayed price discovery hypothesis as subsequent cumulative returns are not significantly negative.
In sum, the short sale circuit breaker does not lead to stock overpricing on average. This result is not consistent with the overvaluation theory. On the other hand, the mixed results of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns in the post-event period suggest that the price discovery process is not significantly affected by the circuit breaker.
It worth noting that as we extend the event window, post event cumulative abnormal returns become increasingly negative and significant. For example, while, the cumulative abnormal return from day 1 through day 10 is -0.056% with a t-statistic of -0.32, for the interval (1,+60) the cumulative abnormal return is -3.87%, with a t statistic of -9.27. One explanation is that the affected stocks have poor fundamentals that persist. An alternative possibility is that predictive power power of the estimated four-factor model decays as we extend the forecast interval.
As robustness tests, the event study is also carried out using Fama-French three-factor model and the Fama-French five-factor model. These results are qualitatively similar to those reported here and are available on request.
G. Impact of Dispersion of Investor Opinions
In this section, we look at the impact of dispersion in investor opinions on the abnormal returns of stocks affected by the triggering of the short-selling circuit breaker. This perspective is largely derived from Miller's (1977) conjecture that, in presence of short sale constraints, wider divergence in investor opinion will result in more negative information being removed from the market and hence, increases the extent of overpricing. A number of empirical studies present evidence consistent with this argument (see, for example, Boehme, Bartley, and Sorin, 2006) .
We use four proxies for capturing investor divergent opinion. The first proxy, , is the standard deviation of the daily raw returns measured in the estimation window (i.e. from day -260 to day -11). Our second proxy for divergent opinions is , the standard deviation of the daily abnormal returns based on the Carhart four-factor model, estimated in the same window. , another widely agreed-upon opinion divergence measure, is used as our third divergent opinion proxy. 12 It represents the daily trading volume scaled by the total number of shares outstanding, averaged over the same estimation window. Our fourth proxy is analyst forecast, , is another frequently used divergent opinion proxy 13 . It is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts on company earnings scaled by the mean forecast. Table 7 provides summary statistics of these proxies. As shown therein the raw standard deviation measure has similar statistical properties as the measure based on abnormal returns from the Carhart four factor model. Analyst forecast dispersion is skewed to the right, consistent with herding behavior.
[Please insert 7 about here]
H. Short Halts, Abnormal Returns and Dispersion of Investor Opinions
Hypothesis 4 is tested by estimating alternative cross-sectional regressions of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of the trigger event days on the cumulative abnormal returns, and the dispersion of opinion proxy variables. The results are shown in Table 8 .
[Please insert Table 8 about here] Models 1 to 4 use the abnormal return when the short selling circuit breaker is first triggered (day 0) as the dependent variable. All divergent opinion measures are significantly negative, meaning that more disagreement among investor opinions leads to lower returns when stocks become short halted.
Model 5 to 8 investigate effects on the day 1 abnormal return. Once again, day 1 is the first full day in which the short sale circuit breaker is in effect throughout the entire day. In contrast to the results from models 1 to 4, the divergence measures are positive and significant. Thus, higher divergence of opinions results in higher returns on the day after the short halt is first 13 See, for example, Goetzmann, Massa (2005), Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002), and Snehal (2011). triggered. This result supports Miller's (1977) conjecture that wider divergence in investor opinions leads to higher overpricing effect for stocks under short selling constraints. As shown below, this effect does not persist in the post event period, after the circuit breaker expires.
Models 9 to 12 provide the results on post-event returns. We focus on abnormal returns over the period in which the short halt trigger is no longer in effect to the end of the trading week (CAR (2,5)). The divergence of opinion proxies are no longer positively related to abnormal returns.
Indeed, the relationships are now negative, with significant results observed for the Turnover variable. These results are consistent with Hypotheis 2: after the short sale circuit breaker expires (and the short selling constraint is removed), wider divergence of investors' opinions does not exacerbate the potential overvaluation effect of the short sale circuit breaker.
I. Price Reversals
Stocks that trigger the short sale circuit breaker usually experience substantial price declines.
Strictly speaking, a stock that declines 10% or more during a given trading day day could recover its losses before the market closes. However, most of the halted stocks in the sample do not fully recover their losses. The mean abnormal return of day 0 is a significant -7.3% in Table   7 . This raises questions about possible price reversal effects on subsequent trading days. Many scholars have documented reversals following large changes in price. study subsequent returns of stocks that decline more than 10% and find significant increases over the following two days. Their result is robust to different sub-periods and threshold values. Atkins and Dyl (1990) find evidence of return reversals after large plunges in stock prices. Conversely, they document downward adjustments after large price increases.
Although the reversals are statistically significant, traders' ability to profit from them largely removed by transactions costs.
To formally test for price reversal effects in the post event period, we regress the event period cumulative abnormal return from day 0 to day 1 using two post event intervals, the four day window beginning with the day on which the circuit breaker is lifted, i.e., the interval from day two to day five , , as well as over an extended ten day window interval, covering day two to day eleven. The analyses are also conducted using market capitalization as a control variable in the regressions. The results are shown in Table 9 below.
[Please insert Table 9 about here] Models 1 and 2, which are based on the post-event cumulative abnormal return afrom day 2 to day 5 show no evidence of return reversal effects, as the event CAR(1,1) coefficient is not significant in either regression. On the other hand, when the post-event period extends to the 11-day period from day 2 to day 12 in Models 3 and 4 are significantly negative (t=-2.18 and t=-2.95 respectively). This result indicates that lower event cumulative returns lead to higher postevent cumulative returns, consistent with price reversion. Note that the estimated intercepts for four models are negative. This implies that for price reversal to occur (return>0), the event CAR has to be substantially negative. This translates to event CAR thresholds of 34% and -27.1% (= −0.01084/ 0.0399) in model 3 and 4, respectively. The vast majority of short halted stocks would not satisfy this requirement as the event CAR has a mean of 7% and a standard deviation of 7.2%. Therefore, we conclude that there is some weak evidence for price reversal effects after the short sale circuit breaker, but only for stocks that have fallen drastically in value.
J. Post-shock drift Large price declines are often harbingers of subsequent poor stock market performance (see e.g. Lu, Wang, and Wang (2014) ). In this section, we compare long-term abnormal returns after large price declines between pre-breaker and post-breaker periods. The abnormal return results for the post-breaker period (February 28, 2011 to February 28, 2012 ) has been discussed above.
Since our short sale circuit breaker algorithm is not restricted by time, we apply the analysis to a simulation that identifies stocks that would have triggered the circuit breaker in the pre-breaker period (May 1, 2009 to February 28, 2011 ). An event study is conducted for the pre-circuit breaker period analogous to that performed above. Table 10 reports the simulated mean abnormal returns from the pre-breaker period vs. the actual post breaker period abnormal returns. The mean difference is shown in the Mean Diff column.
The t-values are determined assuming unequal variances for pre-circuit breaker vs. post-circuit breaker regimes. Most of the event day samples pass the Welch's unequal variances t-test, indicating that the homogeneity assumption holds. The estimates from the two-sample t-test assuming equal variances are nearly identical to those reported here.
The abnormal return results are shown in Table 10 below. To conserve space, detailed results are reported for day the -10 to day 10 interval. Results for extended windows are shown in Figure   2 .
[Please insert Table 10 about here]
As can be seen in Table 10 , the mean difference between the pre-breaker and post-breaker abnormal returns on the event day is neither statistically nor economically significant (differential return of slightly over 0.1% with a t-statistic of 0.47). This is consistent with our previous finding that the circuit breaker does not affect the stock return process or restrain the intraday price decline when it is operative. However, the difference becomes apparent in the aftermath of the trigger, from day two onwards. The circuit breaker substantially increases the abnormal returns from day 2 to day 7. The effect is more pronounced in the long-term.
The direct result of enhanced post-shock returns is a reduction in the post-shock drift effect. [Please insert Figure 2 about here]
We can see both subsamples do not experience significant abnormal returns before triggering the breaker. However, as noted above, there seems to be some information leakage in the postbreaker period as the cumulative abnormal return starts showing signs of plunging beginning on day -3. The extent of decline is almost identical in both subsamples. The most interesting result relates to the pattern of subsequent returns. For the pre-breaker period, an apparent downward trend extends to at least two months after the large decline. This is a typical post-shock drift.
After the circuit breaker was implemented, however, the cumulative abnormal return remains stable for over 30 days. The difference reaches a substantial 2.5% on day 30. This implies that the circuit breaker significantly reduces the post-shock drift effect. The gap gradually closes afterwards. Currently, we do not have a formal conjecture on other possible causes. This is a matter for future investigation.
In sum, together with results in the price reversal section, our evidence supports hypothesis 4 and confirms the informational value of the short sale circuit breaker.
Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of the short sale circuit breaker, Rule 101 on the US stock market. Using a comprehensive sample of stocks from NYSE and Nasdaq, we test the hypothesis that the circuit breaker has no major impact on market returns and market intraday volatility. Our results are largely consistent with this hypothesis. To provide a closer look at the effects of the circuit breaker on highly volatile stocks, we study stock portfolios sorted on intraday price declines. Neither sorted portfolio nor multiple regression approach reports significant improvements in intraday price declines. Indeed the returns of the targeted stocks worsen on the circuit breaker trigger days. We also show that Rule 201 does not impact liquidity or returns of the target stocks.
Next, we measure potential detrimental effects of the short sale circuit breaker in terms of creating stock overvaluation. Since Rule 201 is a short sale restriction, it constrains negative information from being expressed in the market. Together with disagreements on the true values of the securities among investors, this leads to overpricing effects. We identify short halt events by applying Rule 201 on the sample stocks, then use Carhart four-factor asset pricing model to derive the risk-adjusted returns. We find dispersion in investor opinions has a strong negative relation with the event day return; this implies that the large price decline on the event day might be reflect common, but diverse negative opinions. The relation is significantly positive with return of the following day, when the circuit breaker is fully in force for the entire trading session. This is indicative of an overpricing effect of the circuit breaker. Finally, some evidence of price stabilization after stocks trigger the circuit breaker is shown. The short sale circuit breaker is associated with consistent with substantially reduced post-shock drift for over 30 days, consistent with improved informational efficiency.
It worth noting that although the circuit breaker does not impact market quality, the compliance costs of market participants are estimated to be $2 billion in the first year and $1 billion per year thereafter (Johnson, 2010). 14 Whether its informational value justifies its costs is a question tht merits further investigation. This figure reports cumulative abnormal returns around short halts in pre- (May 1, 2009 to February 28, 2011 ) and post-breaker (February 28, 2011 to February 28, 2012 subsamples calculated based on the Carhart fourfactor model. A short halt event is defined as one in which the price of an individual stock dropped at least 10 percent from its last closing price and therefore is subjected to the alternative uptick rule. The event day is denoted as day 0. The estimation window is (-280, -31) , with a minimum length of 150 days. 
Item NOBS
Exchange records 31425
Less records outside regular trading hour 183
Less duplicates 10
Less ticker longer than 4-letter 5558
Less cannot find permno 601
Total 25078
Found in CRSP records 22481 Table 3 Difference-in-difference test on intraday volatility before and after the extended compliance date.
For each volatility measure, the sample stocks are ranked into quintiles based on their time-series average of that volatility measure throughout the sample period. Low (high) portfolio consists of stocks in the lowest (highest) quintile. Mid portfolio includes stocks in the second, third, and fourth quintiles. For each day, the equally weighted average of the volatility measure for three portfolios are calculated. The pre (post) column reports the time-series average of cross-section average of the variable in the pre-circuit breaker period (May 1, 2009 to February 28, 2011 and post-circuit breaker period (February 28, 2011 to February 28, 2012 . The diff column reports the coefficient estimate of circuit breaker dummy from a timeseries regression of the variable on an intercept (not reported) and the circuit breaker dummy. The diff-diff column represents the coefficient estimate of circuit breaker dummy from a time-series regression of the difference of the variable between high and low portfolio on an intercept (not reported) and the circuit breaker dummy. The circuit breaker dummy equals to one if the date is in the post-circuit breaker period and zero otherwise. P_var is Parkinson volatility calculated as (ln( ℎ) − ln( )) 2 /(4 ln 2) (Parkinson, 1980) . Close-close (close-open) volatility is calculated as the square of daily returns based on closing prices (opening to previous day closing price). Intraday (price range) is the difference between daily high and low prices standardized by closing price (high price). Positive semivariance is calculated as max[0, log( / −1 )] 2 and negative semivariance is calculated as min[0, log( / −1 )] 2 (Markowitz 1959) . T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Sample stocks are sorted into decile portfolios on percentage of intraday decline, which is calculated as = ( − −1 )/ −1 , where is the daily low price, and is the closing price. The pre (post) column represents the time-series average of intraday decline of the portfolio. The diff column reports the coefficient estimate of circuit breaker dummy from a timeseries regression of the variable on an intercept (not reported) and the circuit breaker dummy. The circuit breaker dummy equals to one if the day is in the post-circuit breaker period (February 28, 2011 -February 28, 2012 and zero otherwise. The portfolios are rebalanced daily. Value-weighted (Equal-weighted) results are reported in Panel A (Panel B). Percentile portfolios only consist of stocks with intraday decline larger than or equal to 10%, 7.5%, or 5% are built in the same fashion and are presented in Panel C. The sample period is from May 1, 2009 to February 28, 2012. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 5 Difference-in-difference regression on intraday volatility, liquidity, and returns.
Low
Intraday decline, Turnover, and Return are regressed on the Halt (Effect) dummy and its interaction with the SSCB dummy, SSCB*Halt (SSCB*Effect). Trigger equals to one if the stock triggers the short sale circuit breaker on that day and zero otherwise. Effect dummy equals to one if the stock is under the circuit breaker's effect and zero otherwise. SSCB is a dummy indicating whether the date is after the full compliance date, it equals to one in the post-breaker period (February 28, 2011 to February 28, 2012 and zero otherwise. All regressions include firm-fixed effect and intercepts are dropped to avoid perfect collinearity. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The table reports the description statistics of variables that proxy for the dispersion of investor opinions around short halts. A short halt event is defined as one in which the price of an individual stock dropped at least 10 percent from its last closing price and therefore is subjected to the alternative uptick rule. is the standard deviation of the daily raw returns in the estimation window of (-280, -31) , with a minimum length of 150 days.
Model
is the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns in the same estimation window based on the Carhart four-factor model. is the average daily trading volume in the same estimation window, scaled by outstanding shares. ANALYST is the standard deviation of the analyst forecasted values of earnings-per-share, scaled by the absolute value of average forecasts. This table reports the cross-sectional regression results of Abnormal Returns with different periods around short halts over proxy variables for dispersion of investor opinions. A short halt event is defined as one in which the price of an individual stock dropped at least 10 percent from its last closing price and therefore is subjected to the alternative uptick rule.
(0) and (1) are the abnormal returns on the short halt day and the subsequent full short halt day respectively. (2,5), is the cumulative abnormal returns over the 4-day window (2,5) subsequent to the short halt event. The abnormal returns are based on the Carhart four-factor model with an estimation window of (-280, -31 ) and a minimum length of 150 days.
is the standard deviation of the daily raw. is the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns in the same estimation window. is the average daily trading volume in the same estimation window, scaled by outstanding shares. ANALYST is the standard deviation of the analyst forecasted values of earnings-per-share, scaled by the absolute value of average forecasts. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. MODEL AR (0) AR (1 Table 9 Cross-sectional Regression of post-event cumulative abnormal returns during 3-day and 10-day Windows around short halts
This table reports the cross-sectional regression results of the post-event s around short halts over the and the size-control variable . A short halt event is defined as one in which the price of an individual stock dropped at least 10 percent from its last closing price and therefore is subjected to the alternative uptick rule. Post-event are the cumulative returns in 4-day window (2,5) and 11-day window (2,12) around the short halt event date.
is the cumulative abnormal return in the 2-day window (0,1) around the event date. The abnormal returns are based on the Carhart four-factor model with an estimation window of (-280, -31 ) and a minimum length of 150 days.
is the logarithm of market capital six days before the short halt event. T-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table reports the abnormal returns based on the Carhart four-factor model around short halts in both pre-breaker (May 1, 2009 to February 28, 2011 ) and post-breaker (February 28, 2011 to February 28, 2012 subsamples. A short halt event is defined as one in which the price of an individual stock dropped at least 10 percent from its last closing price and therefore is subjected to the alternative uptick rule. The event day is denoted as day 0. The estimation window is (-280,-31) with a minimum length of 150 days. Prebreaker mean (Post-breaker mean) column is the mean abnormal return in the pre-breaker (post-breaker) subsample. Mean Diff is the mean difference calculated by subtracting the pre-breaker mean from the post-breaker mean. The t-value is the t-statistic from a twosample test for equal means. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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